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THE DATE OF TAKING IN CALIFORNIA CONDEMNATION
PROCEEDINGS: A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
In condemnation proceedings, there are two dates of particular
significance-the date of "taking" and the date of valuation. The
date of "taking" is the date on which control of condemned property
passes from the condemnee to the condemnor.1 The date on which
property is appraised for condemnation award purposes is designated
the date of valuation.2 In California condemnation proceedings, these
two dates do not concur in point of time. This lack of concurrence
has created problems for the condemnee, the condemnor and the pub-
lic at large. The purpose of this note is to explore the problems
caused by the nonconcurrence of these two dates and to suggest
possible solutions to these problems.
California "Taking" and Valuation Dates
Hardships Caused by the Late "Taking" Date
The date of "taking" in California is determined by statute to be
the date on which the court's "final order of condemnation" is re-
corded,3 and the condemnor cannot gain possession until such final
order. The valuation date is the date the summons is served on the
condemnee.4 Since the condemnor cannot gain possession of the prop-
erty until a "final order of condemnation" is rendered,5 the commence-
ment of construction for schools, streets, hospitals, and housing pro-
jects, although in great demand by the public, must often await the
outcome of protracted litigation. This delay is a burden on both the
condemnor and the public at large since the condemnor must post-
pone the construction and the public must postpone its use and en-
joyment.6 The delay will also result in added construction costs since
1 See, e.g., Sebastian Bridge Dist. v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 292 F. 345, 349-
51 (8th Cir. 1923); 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN
§ 3 (2d ed. 1953).
2 See, e.g., Sacramento Terminal Co. v. McDougall, 19 Cal. App. 562,
563-64, 126 P. 503, 504 (1912); 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF
EmINENT DOMAIN § 21 (2d ed. 1953).
3 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1253: "The title to the property described in
the final order of condemnation vests in the plaintiff for the purposes de-
scribed therein upon the date that a certified copy of the final order of
condemnation is recorded in the office of the recorder of the county."
4 CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1249.
5 San Mateo County v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 637, 63 P. 78, 80 (1900).
Contra, CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1243.4 (the only exception and it is applicable
to rights of way or reservoir land).
0 Stalling tactics are sometimes used by one of the parties to prolong the
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these costs routinely increase with the passage of time.
The condemnor and the public are not the only ones harmed by
the delay. Between the commencement of the condemnation proceed-
ing and the final adjudication, the condemnee's beneficial use of the
property remains in a state of suspension. It is virtually impossible
for him to sell, lease or rent the land, and any improvements con-
structed on the land after the service of summons will not be in-
cluded in the condemnation award. California Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 12497 forbids compensation for improvements, whether
necessary or not,8 made after the property valuation date. Since the
valuation date often precedes the date of taking by a considerable
amount of time, there may be a lengthy period during which the
condemnee can neither protect nor sell his property. This creates
many problems. The condemnee is faced with the undesirable alter-
native of either allowing his property to 'deteriorate, or of expending
money for improvements without a right of reimbursement. The
condemnor, on the other hand, is permitted by statute to reduce the
amount of the condemnation award where the condemned property is
injured after the date of valuation but before the date of the taking.9
The condemnor in California, then, enjoys a more advantageous posi-
court proceedings further. Letter from Harold W. Culver to the California
Law Revision Commission, June 30, 1966, in Taylor, Possession Prior to Final
Judgment in California Condemnation Procedure, 7 SANTA CLARA LAW. 37, 47
n.34 (1967).
7 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1249: 'For the purpose of assessing compen-
sation and damages the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the
date of the issuance of summons and its actual value at that date shall be the
measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis
of damages to property not actually taken but injuriously affected, in all cases
where such damages are allowed .. .provided, that in any case in which
the issue is not tried within one year after the date of the commencement of
the action, unless the delay is caused by the defendant, the compensation and
damages shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the trial. No improve-
ments put upon the property subsequent to the date of the service of summons
shall be included in the assessment of compensation or damages."
8 See Recommendation and Study Relating to Taking Possession and
Passage of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3 CAL. LAW REVISIoN
CoamVr'N REPORTS; REcoMIENDATIoNs & STuDIEs B-1, B-54-55 (1960) [herein-
after cited as CAL. L. REVISION ComW'N]. It is not clear even in California
if compensation is allowed for improvements made prior to service, but after
notice of pending condemnation.
9 Redevelopment Agency v. Maxwell, 193 Cal. App. 2d 414, 419, 14 Cal.
Rptr. 170, 174 (1961); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1249.1: "All improvements per-
taining to the realty that are on the property at the time of the service of
summons and which affect its value shall be considered in the assessment of
compensation, damages and special benefits unless they are removed or de-
stroyed before the earliest of the following times: (a) The time the title to
the property is taken by the plaintiff. (b) The time the possession of the
property is taken by the plaintiff. (c) The time the defendant moves from
the property in compliance with an order of possession."
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tion than that of the condemnee. Most other states have recognized
the inequity of this situation, and have allowed recovery for good
faith improvements up to the time of the taking.10
Abandonment and Estoppel
In California, the condemnor may abandon the condemnation
"proceeding at any time after the filing of the complaint and before
the expiration of 30 days after final judgment . ".".."I' Because of
this provision, the condemnee who may have substantially changed
his position in reliance on the condemnor's statement of proposed
condemnation (e.g., by allowing his property to deteriorate, or by
turning down opportunities to sell or relocate in another area) often
was left with substantial damages when the condemnor abandoned
the proceedings. To alleviate this situation, the California courts
formulated a doctrine of estoppel to prohibit the abandonment of a
condemnation proceeding "where justice and right" required compen-
sation.
12
Times-Mirror Company v. Superior Court' illustrates the ap-
plication of this estoppel theory. In that case, the plaintiff was as-
sured by the city council that his property would be taken by con-
demnation and that there would not be an abandonment.' 4 Relying
on those assurances, the plaintiff relocated his plant on other property
at a cost of 4.6 million dollars.'3 The city council subsequently aban-
doned the condemnation. Because the situation was exceptional, and
all the equities were in the favor of the plaintiff, the court estopped
the abandonment. 10
Unfortunately, this estoppel doctrine was limited by the courts
to those cases in which all equities appeared to be in favor of the
10 See, e.g., Showalter v. Arizona, 48 Ariz. 523, 363 P.2d 189 (1963);
Louisville S.R.R. v. Cogar, 15 Ky. L. Rptr. 444 (Super. Ct. 1893); Maher v.
Commonwealth, 291 Mass. 343, 197 N.E. 78 (1935); In re New York City, 196
N.Y. 255, 89 N.E. 814 (1909); In re Wall Street, 17 Barb. 617 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1854); Portland v. Lee Sam, 7 Ore. 397 (1879); Driver v. Western U.R.R., 32
Wis. 569 (1873). For collection of cases see, 27 Am. Jun. 2d Eminent Domain
§ 294 (1966). Contra, Lloyd v. Fair Haven, 67 Vt. 167, 31 A. 164 (1894).
11 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255a(a): "The plaintiff may abandon the pro-
ceeding at any time after the filing of the complaint and before the expiration
of 30 days after final judgment, by serving on defendants and filing in court a
written notice of such abandonment; and failure to comply with Section 1251
of this code shall constitute an implied abandonment of the proceeding."
See People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. App.
2d 393, 399, 118 P.2d 47, 51 (1941).
12 Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 2d 309, 328, 44 P.2d 547,
556 (1935); Los Angeles v. Cohn, 101 Cal. 373, 377, 35 P. 1002, 1004 (1884).
13 3 Cal. 2d 309, 44 P.2d 547 (1935).
'4 Id. at 324-25, 44 P.2d at 554-55.
'5 Id. at 326, 44 P.2d at 555.
10 Id. at 331, 44 P.2d at 557.
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condemneeYt For example, in Gibson Properties v. Oakland, s the
plaintiff contemplated building a warehouse on his property but was
informally notified that part of his land was to be taken by the city
to widen a street. 19 The plaintiff, nevertheless, began work on the
warehouse.20  After an ordinance was passed evidencing the city's
intention to take the property, the city commissioner ordered the
plaintiff to cease and desist any building operations near the prop-
erty to be condemned. 21 The plaintiff, in compliance with the set-
back order, ceased that construction and built his warehouse on ad-
jacent land, which was twenty feet from the proposed widened street,
at an additional expense of $5,696.60.22 The city subsequently aban-
doned the condemnation proceedings and the plaintiff sued for dam-
ages.23
The appellate court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover be-
cause there was nothing "exceptional" in his claim. The court there-
upon distinguished Times-Mirror, and, further, held that the estoppel
rule was "governed by the general rule which holds that by a dismissal
of a condemnation proceeding after judgment fixing the value of the
property sought to be condemned, a municipality is not liable for
damages in the absence of statute authorizing such recovery."24 It
appears the court felt that since the plaintiff had begun building after
he received notification of the proposed condemnation, all the equities
were not in his favor.
In order to provide a more effective theory of estoppel against
abandonment by the condemnor, the California Legislature in 1961
adopted Code of Civil Procedure section 1255a (b), which states:
The court may, upon motion made within 30 days after such abandon-
ment, set aside the abandonment if it determines that the position of
the moving party has been substantially changed to his detriment in
justifiable reliance upon the proceedings and such party cannot be
restored to substantially the same position as if the proceeding had
not been commenced. 25
This provision will solve many of the problems caused by abandon-
ment, provided the words "substantial" and "justifiable" are liberally
construed by the courts.26 No cases have, as yet, directly construed
17 Recommendation and Study Relating to Taking Possession and Pass-
age of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3 CAL. L. REvisioN Comvn'vr'
B-1, B-54-55 (1960).
18 12 Cal. 2d 291, 83 P.2d 942 (1938).
19 Id. at 293, 83 P.2d at 943.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 294, 83 P.2d at 943.
22 Id. at 294, 83 P.2d at 944.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 301, 83 P.2d at 947.
25 CAL. CoDE Ci. PRoc. § 1255a(b) (emphasis added).
26 Section 1255a(c) of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a closely
related section, was designed to aid victims of an abandonment in providing
for reimbursement for "necessary attorneys fees" in a condemnation proceed-
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this amendment; however, one California appellate court has stated
that the statute merely codifies the old equity rule limiting the right
of a public entity to abandon a condemnation proceeding.27
Advantages of Present System of Valuation
A solution of the difficulties caused by the existence of different
dates for taking and valuation does not lie in changing the valuation
date to make it coincide with the "taking" date. It is desirable to
have the valuation date early in the proceedings, and any attempt to
move this date to a later stage of the proceedings should be resisted.
The advantage gained from an early valuation date is that it avoids
many of the problems caused by the fluctuations in property values
that usually accompany condemnation proceedings. 28
These fluctuations are generally created by attempts of land spec-
ulators to profit from a potential condemnation.29 Normally, during
the period between the beginning of feasibility studies and the time
of final site selection, property values in the area under study tend to
move upwards. This increase in value is due primarily to speculative
anticipation of a generous award.30 After the condemnation proceed-
ings commence, the fluctuations in the value of the property will
depend upon whether a large or small award is expected from the
court.
3 1
In California, because the valuation occurs at the commencement
of the action (i.e., the date of the service of summons), fluctuations
that occur after that date are excluded. Thus, the only fluctuations
that the California courts must take into consideration are those that
occur before the condemnation action commences. In many states
there is a considerable lag between the date on which notice of the
condemnation proceeding is made and the date on which the property
is valued. When the valuation date is delayed until the date of the
final court judgment, or the date of entry by the condemnor onto the
ing incurred before a subsequent abandonment. The word "necessary" has,
however, been narrowly applied, and the condemnee has not been able to
get full reimbursement for attorneys fees. See California Interstate Tel. Co.
v. Prescott, 228 Cal. App. 2d 408, 39 Cal. Rptr. 472 (1964); Inglewood v.
Johnson, 113 Cal. App. 2d 587, 248 P.2d 536 (1952). This strict construction
given section 1255a(c) may be indicative of the judicial treatment which sec-
tion 1255a(b) can expect.
27 In re Mercantile Guarantee Co., 263 A.C.A. 356, 365, 69 Cal. Rptr.
361, 367 (1968) (dictum): "The application of the estoppel doctrine in this
area is a fairly old and well-established practice. Section 1255(a) subdivi-
sion (b) codifies the doctrine. .. "
23 Burt v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 115 Mass. 1, 14 (1874).
29 Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain, 30 U. CHm L. REv. 319,
348 (1963).
30 Note, Updating The Time of Taking in Condemnation Proceedings ir,
Oklahoma, 4 TULSA L.J. 95, 100 (1967).
31 Id.
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property, there is more time for fluctuating market activity. In other
words, if the valuation date is the date of the judgment, the courts are
faced with the burdensome task of sorting out what percentage of the
rise in value during the proceedings is natural, and what percentage
is induced by the condemnation proceeding itself. Since the valuation
date in California is the date the action is commenced, this burden on
the court is reduced. The court merely must determine the value of
the property at the commencement of the proceedings, and any fluctu-
ation or inflationary changes after that date need not be considered.
When the courts of states that have a valuation date subsequent
to commencement of the condemnation proceedings are faced with
fluctuations in value, they usually circumvent the problems caused
by these fluctations by estimating the value of the property before
the taking was authorized. This is done by admitting evidence of the
value of the same or similar property prior to the date that notice of
the condemnation was given.3 2 In California, since the valuation date
is early in the proceedings, there are fewer fluctuations with which
to contend. Further, the California valuation date always occurs at a
fixed point, i.e., the date of service of summons, and both sides can
rely on the fact that the value of the property is to be determined as
of that date.33 In other states, where the valuation can occur on more
than one date, there can be no such reliance.34
Changing the valuation date to a later point in the condemnation
proceedings, e.g., the date of taking, would avoid the hardships result-
ing from the time interval between the valuation and taking dates.
However, the advantages of avoiding undue fluctuations in property
value, in addition to the advantage of having the valuation date
predetermined, outweigh the benefit that can be gained from delay-
ing the valuation date.
Changing the Time of Taking
The law of condemnation must accommodate two fundamental
rights. The first is the right of the public acting through its govern-
mental bodies to take private property for public use, and the second
is the right of the individual to receive just compensation for prop-
erty so taken. Often in California, because the date of taking is after
the final order of condemnation, neither right is efficiently served.
If the taking date were changed to correspond to the valuation
date, the problems occurring in the time between the valuation and
taking dates would be eliminated. The condemnee would be relieved
of his property at an earlier date, and would avoid the risk of an
abandonment. The condemnor also would be aided by an earlier
taking date, since delays in the commencement of government proj-
82 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 379 (1943).
33 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 284, 287 (1958).
34 See Metier v. Easton & A.R.R., 37 N.J.L. 222, 224 (Sup. Ct. 1874);
Yara Eng'r Corp. v. Newark, 136 N.J. Eq. 453, 464, 42 A.2d 632, 638 (Ch. 1945).
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ects would be reduced.
The reason for delaying the "taking" until the final adjudication
is to protect the condemnee by ensuring that all relevant matters are
examined before the "taking."35 Theoretically, the judicial aspect of
the condemnation proceeding is designed to provide a forum for de-
ciding whether the condemnation is a necessity,36 whether the "tak-
ing" is for a public use,87 and whether the compensation is indeed
,,just."3 8
In practice, however, condemnation proceedings in most states
accomplish much less than this. The necessity of the "taking" has
been effectively eliminated as a justiciable issue in California because
there is, in all practicality, immunity from judicial reversal on the
determnation of necessity.39 It is provided by statute that
... when the [governing body] shall by resolution or ordinance ...
have... determined that the public interest and necessity require the
acquisition... the property described in such resolution or ordinance,
shall be conclusive evidence: (a) of the public necessity of such
proposed public utility or public improvement, (b) that such prop-
erty is necessary therefor, and (c) that such proposed public utility
or improvement is planned or located in the manner which will be
most compatible with the greatest public good, and the least private
injury ... 40
In People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Chevalier,41 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court refused to consider allegations of fraud, bad
faith, or abuse of discretion because the ordinance and resolution
authorizing the condemnation action were said to be conclusive evi-
dence of the necessity for the proposed public improvement.42
The determination of whether the "taking" is for a public use is
also rarely an issue. California courts hold that the power to deter-
mine what uses are public rests solely with the legislature.43 Almost
35 See Sanborn v. Belden, 51 Cal. 266, 268-69 (1876).
H6 Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 532, 28 P. 681,
682 (1891).
37 University of So. Cal. v. Robbins, 1 Cal. App. 2d 523, 525, 37 P.2d 163,
164 (1934).
8 Id.
39 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Chevalier, 52 Cal. 2d 299,
307, 340 P.2d 598, 603 (1959); Anaheim Union High School Dist. v. Vieira, 241
Cal. App. 2d 169, 171-72, 51 Cal. Rptr. 94, 96 (1966).
40 CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 1241(2) (emphasis added).
41 52 Cal. 2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959).
42 Id. at 307, 340 P.2d at 603.
43 Kern County High School Dist. v. McDonald, 180 Cal. 7, 13, 179 P.
180, 183 (1919); Stockton & V.R.R. v. Common Council, 41 Cal. 147, 168-69
(1871). The United States Supreme Court leaves the determination of public
use to the governmental agency in a federal condemnation action. Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-34 (1954). The California Law Revision Commission
states that the question of public use is no longer of importance to the courts,
and the only issue left to litigate is just compensation. Tentative Recommen-
dation and a Study Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure, 8
CAL. L. RELIsIoN Comm'w 1109 (1967).
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any objective that the legislature or other authorized governing body
determines is for the public welfare will be upheld by the courts.4
The only time the courts investigate whether the "taking" is for a
"public use" is when it appears that the property might be going to a
private concern.45
Since the condemnee cannot prove want of necessity for the
"taking," and the existence of a "public use" is generally presumed in
favor of the condemnor, the basic problem in this type of litigation is
usually the determination of "just compensation. '46 Since "just com-
pensation" could be determined with the same degree of precision af-
ter the "taking" as before, there appears to be no reason to prohibit a
"taking" by the condemnor prior to the determination of damages. In
other words, the fact that the "taking" date is advanced to a point
earlier in the condemnation proceedings (e.g., the date of valuation)
would not affect the process of computing the award, nor would it
change the "justness" of the compensation.
Constitutionality of the California Condemnation Procedure
It is questionable whether the California policy of setting the
valuation date prior in time to the "taking" date fulfills the constitu-
tional requirement that just compensation be paid for the public tak-
ing of private property. The United States Supreme Court has ruled
that in federal condemnation actions the condemnee is entitled to the
full market value of his property at the date of the taking.47 The
Supreme Court allows an alternate basis for recovery only when price
fluctuations, caused by land speculator activity, have made the mar-
ket price an inaccurate indicator of the normal value of the property.4 8
Although every state has adopted a constitutional provision providing
that "just compensation" be paid an individual whose property is
taken by a state,49 many states do not require that the valuation occur
at the date of the taking.50
44 Los Angeles County v. Anthony, 224 Cal. App. 2d 103, 106, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 308, 310 (1964).
45 See People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Mahabedian, 171 Cal.
App. 2d 302, 307-08, 340 P.2d 1053, 1056 (1959), where the court stated that
evidence may be introduced to show that the condemned land was to go to
a private auto park.
46 Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to Condemnation
Law and Procedure, 8 CAL. L. REvisioN Comvnw'N 1109 (1967).
47 Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939); Murray v. United
States, 130 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1942); see Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining
Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963).48 United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Shoemaker v. United
States, 147 U.S. 282 (1892); Kerr v. South Park Comm'rs, 117 U.S. 379,
386 (1881); United States v. Vilbig, 208 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1953).
49 See, e.g., Beals v. Los Angeles, 23 Cal. 2d 381, 387, 144 P.2d 839, 843
(1943); Frost Coal Co. v. Boston, 259 Mass. 354, 359, 156 N.E. 676, 677 (1927);
3 P. NicHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.1(2) (rev. 3d ed. 1965).
50 Desert Waters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 91 Ariz. 163, 173, 370 P.2d 652,
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The United States Supreme Court has refused to invalidate Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure section 1249, which provides that valu-
ation be determined on the date of summons, because the Court felt it
could not "reverse the decisions of the state courts in regard to ques-
tions of general justice and equitable considerations in the taking of
property."51 The Court thereby implied that a state could follow its
own methods, within reason, of ensuring just compensation. Massa-
chusetts52 and New York,53 however, have declared unconstitutional
statutes similar to the California Code of Civil Procedure section 1249
on the grounds of a taking of property without "just compensation."
Both courts held that in order to satisfy the requirement of "just
compensation," the condemnee must be compensated for the full value
of his property as of the date of the "taking." It was felt that any
valuation date prior to the "taking" would not satisfy this require-
ment. The California courts have affirmed the constitutionality of
section 1249 on the rationale that valuation must be placed at some
time prior to the "taking"- if compensation is to be paid at the time of
the "taking."54  One appellate decision, not followed elsewhere in
California, circumvented the question of the constitutionality of sep-
arating the taking and valuation dates by classifying the valuation
date as a "constructive taking."55 However, since a "taking" only
occurs on the date that a final order of condemnation is rendered,
any theory of a "taking," constructive or otherwise, before the date is
unfounded.
Alternatives to California's Rules
Federal Rule
The federal condemnation procedures illustrate that many of Cali-
fornia's problems may be alleviated by providing an earlier date of
"taking." The original federal rule required federal courts to follow
the procedure of the state in which the condemned land was located.5
This meant that emergency federal projects were delayed for long
periods of time when the federal government instituted condemnation
proceedings in states like California. The new federal condemnation
rules57 eliminate reliance on state procedures and provide a uniform
659 (1962); see 3 P. NiCHOLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DO1AAN § 8.5(2) (rev.
3d ed. 1965), for a compilation of states that assess compensation before the
taking.
51 Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314, 320 (1902).
52 Edwards v. Bruorton, 184 Mass. 529, 69 N.E. 328 (1904).
53 Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893).
54 See, e.g., Pasadena v. Porter, 201 Cal. 381, 390, 257 P. 526, 530 (1927);
California S.R.R. v. Kimball, 61 Cal. 90 (1882).
55 Los Angeles v. Blondeau, 127 Cal. App. 139, 141, 15 P.2d 554, 555
(1932).
56 In re Secretary of Treasury, 45 F. 396, 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1891).
57 Rule 71A of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. Rule 71A
(1964).
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practice to be followed in federal courts. Although this procedure is
efficient, in order to eliminate any delay in emergency situations the
Federal Declaration of Taking Act 58 was passed. It provides for an
immediate taking of property by the federal government whenever
necessary:
Upon the filing said declaration of taking and of the deposit in the
court. . . of the estimated compensation.., title... shall vest in the
United States, and the right of just compensation for the same shall
vest in the persons entitled thereto .... 59
The Act cannot be used in condemnation proceedings where no im-
mediate need to acquire possession of the property is shown.60
The Court of Claims explains the mechanics of the Declaration of
Taking Act as follows:
[T]hat in any condemnation action, the Government may, contem-
poraneously with the filing of the petition or any time prior to judg-
ment, file a declaration of taking covering the lands described in the
petition. The declaration must contain certain prescribed statements
and descriptions and if, at the time the declaration is filed the United
States deposits the estimated compensation for the lands with the
court, title in fee simple absolute or some lesser estate, if requested,
will then vest in the United States. At the same time, the right to
immediately receive the estimated compensation vests in the land-
owner.61
Once the declaration of taking is filed6 2 and title vests, the federal
government is bound to pay some award. Since the amount of the
"estimated compensation" deposited in court, as provided by the Act,
is only tentative and does not prejudice the ultimate award, it is not
reviewable except when wanton abuse of discretion by the condemnor
in estimating damages is alleged.63
The amount deposited in court as an estimate binds neither
party to an amount of damages equal to the estimate; indeed, it has
"no bearing whatsoever on value."" An opportunity for a court de-
termination of damages is afforded the condemnee after the "taking,"
and he may have a jury trial on all relevant issues.0 5 Moreover, if
58 Federal Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1964).
59 Id.
60 Rule 71A of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. Rule 71A
(1964).
61 Travis v. United States, 287 F.2d 916, 918-19 (Ct. C1. 1961).
62 Federal Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. § 258a (1964). The
Declaration must contain the following when filed: "(1) A statement of the
authority under which and the public use for which said lands are taken.
(2) A description of the lands taken sufficient for the identification thereof.
(3) A statement of the estate or interest in said lands taken for said public
use. (4) A plan showing the lands taken. (5) A statement of the sum of
money estimated by said acquiring authority to be just compensation for
the land taken."
63 Lee v. United States, 58 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
64 Chapman v. United States, 169 F.2d 641, 644 (10th Cir. 1948).
65 United States v. Theimer, 199 F.2d 501, 503-04 (10th Cir. 1952).
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the condemnee is dissatisfied with the verdict, he is permitted an
appeal to a higher federal court.66
Recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission
The California Law Revision Commission recently has recom-
mended an expansion 67 of the situations where the condemnor may
acquire the right to immediate possession6 8 of property. The com-
mission called for legislation providing for immediate possession
where "the court determines that (a) the plaintiff is entitled to take
the property, and (b) the plaintiff's need for early possession clearly
outweighs any hardship the owner . . . will suffer if possession is
taken .... "69 In all other situations where the condemnor would not
be harmed by possible delays, the current California condemnation
procedure would be retained. It was also suggested that the right to
immediate possession "be limited to public entities, public utilities, and
common carriers."70
The recommendation contains safeguards designed to eliminate
abuse of the right to an immediate taking. The condemnee is given
the right to answer the immediate possession order,71 and to introduce
evidence of any hardship that he would suffer if immediate possession
is authorized. Contrary to the Federal Declaration of Taking Act,
title to the condemned property would not vest with the "taking,"
and could be obtained only after the final court adjudication.72 The
purpose of withholding title is ostensibly to give the condemnee an
opportunity to present his case before ownership is transferred.
The Commission's recommendation is not fully adequate since it
fails to change the date of "taking." Even in those situations covered
by the Commission's recommendation, no proposals regarding com-
pensation for improvements, or eliminating the gap between the date
of valuation and the date of "taking," were made. In those situations
not covered by the proposed legislation, that is, where no need for
immediate possession can be proved, the same problems relating to
valuation, delay and abandonment would still exist.
An immediate "taking" without transfer of title, as recommended
by the Commission, would not cure the problems of abandonment,
since until the title passed there would always be the possibility that
the condemnor would abandon. If the condemnor did take possession,
however, there probably would be a significant change of position,
66 See Clarksville v. United States, 198 F.2d 238, 240 (4th Cir. 1952).
67 California Code of Civil Procedure section 1243.4 provides the only sit-
uations where immediate possession is allowed, and it only applies to rights
of way and reservoir land.
68 Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to Condemnation
Law and Procedure, 8 CAL. L. REVISION COmM'N 1109-10 (1967).
69 Id. at 1110.
70 Id.
7' Id. at 1222.
72 See id. at 1132-33.
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which would invoke the estoppel doctrine of California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1255 (b). However, if the abandoned land were
originally vacant, there probably would be no change of position as
contemplated in the statute, and no recovery could be obtained if the
owner merely lost an opportunity to sell the land while it was under
governmental control. Further, the Commission made no recommen-
dation to ease the requirements for invoking the doctrine of estoppel.
Model Eminent Domain Code
Instead of vesting the power to transfer title to land in a judicial
body, many states have given that power to governmental agencies.7 3
The usual procedure of these states is to provide for an immediate
"taking" with an automatic judicial review of the damages awarded.7 4
Such an alternative is presented in the Preliminary Draft of the Model
Code of Eminent Domain,75 which has recommended a procedure
allowing the condemnor to obtain title to property quickly while still
providing judicial protection for the condemnee.
Under this procedure, the taking is to occur at the time of the
filing of a petition by the condemnor in a court of proper jurisdiction:
Condemnation . .. shall be effected only by the filing in court of a
declaration of taking, with such security as may be required ... and
thereupon the title ... to the property condemned shall pass to the
condemnor on the date of such filing . ... 76
Since title does pass with the "taking," there is no risk of abandon-
ment by the condemnor. If the condemnor abandons the condemna-
tion proceedings, he has the obligation to dispose of the property. If
the property has not been substantially improved, it must first be
offered to the condemnee at the same price paid by the condemnor. 77
The Model Code further provides that the amount of compensa-
tion is measured by the value of the property at the time of the "tak-
ing." Judicial protection is provided for the condemnee by allowing
either the condemnee or the condemnor to file a petition requesting
the appointment of a commission, which is empowered to determine
the final award of damages .7  The parties, however, may waive com-
73 This is commonly termed an administrative method of taking and is
described in 6 NICHOLs, Tim LAW OF EmiNENT DoA.NT § 24.112 (rev. 3d ed.
1965) as follows: "A board of public officers, or the directors of a corporation
seeking to acquire land by eminent domain and having the requisite authority
from the legislature, passes a formal vote, ordinance or resolution to take
certain designated land, and upon the filing of a copy of this vote, or "taking"
... the title to the land at once vests in the condemnor." See, e.g., Bates v.
Boston, Elevated R.R., 187 Mass. 328, 332, 77 N.E. 1017, 1019 (1905).
74 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-801 to -807 (Supp. 1967).
75 ABA MODEL EVInENT DomLAnm CODE (Preliminary Draft, 1967), in 2
REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 365 (1967).
76 Id. § 303, at 368.
77 Id. § 313, at 372-73.
78 Id. § 503, at 374.
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mission proceedings by written agreement, stipulate damages, 70 and
proceed directly to the court on the remaining issues of law.
80
The right to redress under the Model Code does not stop with a
commission hearing. An appeal may be filed within thirty days after
the conclusion of the commission hearing with the court in which the
notice was originally filed.8 ' From there the decision can be appealed
in the same manner as any other case.8 2 These provisions grant
adequate protection to both parties.
The Model Eminent Domain Code, by not requiring a judicial
proceeding prior to the taking, avoids the problems associated with a
delayed "taking." By allowing the title to pass at the start of proceed-
ings, the Model Code liberates the land from the inactivity that re-
sults when ownership is in one party and control in another. With
such an early "taking," the condemnor can proceed more quickly with
the public improvement, and the condemnee is assured of compensa-
tion.
Also, since title would pass as soon as the condemnor filed a peti-
tion, governmental agencies could make liberal use of the power to
condemn property. But since the courts now, in reality, only review
the compensation to be awarded, there would be no greater risk of
more frequent condemnation activity than already exists. Govern-
mental agencies have a natural tendency to try to expand their
powers. Since the award of damages is most frequently the only
justiciable issue, any attempts to control the agencies' power to con-
demn by cumbersome judicial procedures only succeeds in injuriously
delaying condemnation actions.
While the provisions of the Model Eminent Domain Code are
desirable, it is doubtful that they could be adapted in California
without a constitutional amendment. Since the eminent domain
clause of the California Constitution has been interpreted to require
final adjudication before the taking, 3 the constitution would most
likely have to be amended to allow for an earlier taking.8 4
79 Id. § 501, at 374.
80 Id. § 502, at 374.
81 Id. § 504A, at 377-78.
82 Id. § 504A, at 379.
83 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14: "Private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation having first been made to, or
paid into court for the owner . . . ." For even a minor change such as
allowing an immediate taking in right-of-way and reservoir condemnation
actions, an amendment to the constitution was passed. The California Law
Revision Commission, in its recommendation, recognized the need for a consti-
tutional amendment to carry out their limited proposals.
84 An acceptable amendment might be: Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without an estimate of probable compensa-
tion having first been made, and a bond for that amount paid into court. If
judicial proceedings to ascertain just compensation have not begun within
ninety days from the date of the taking, a writ may be issued ordering the
immediate commencement of proceedings. The amount determined as just
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Conclusion
Because of the late date of taking in California, the parties to a
condemnation action are faced with intolerable hardships and delays.
The recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission, in
failing to change the time of taking completely, does not solve all the
problems. In condemnation actions where there would be no im-
mediate possession under the Commission recommendation, the same
problems of valuation and abandonment would still exist. Addition-
ally, much litigation to contest the necessity of an immediate posses-
sion order probably would result from this proposal.
The Model Code on Eminent Domain provides a satisfactory solu-
tion to the problems surrounding the time of taking. Since the tak-
ing under the Code occurs upon the filing of a petition to condemn,
the solution would eliminate the gap between the valuation and tak-
ing dates. The condemning agency would be able to begin its proj-
ects without delay, and the condemnee could obtain some immediate
compensation. As title is transferred with the taking, there would be
no risk to the condemnee of an abandonment.
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